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Article 11

Economics of Kashmir Confict

Bilal A. Pandow

In a political confict like Kashmir, human
loss is the frst tragedy coupled with the
economic damage to the oppressed class.
Repeated shutdowns that include curfews
and protests have dented the economy of
Kashmir, a fact that is irrefutable. However,
this is supplemented by the ‘normalcy period’
that paves way for the economic captivity of
the region. The Narendra Modi government’s
decision to abrogate Article 370, which
guaranteed a special status to Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K) under the Indian constitution,
and divide the J&K state into two separate
Union Territories on 05 August 2019 has
already immensely dented the local economy
to the tune of 17878 crore of Indian rupees.
The decision is expected to further tarnish
the economy of J&K, an economy which could
have been enhanced to serve the needs of
local people and the developmental project
of the state. In the past, there were instances
when the state’s economic potential was
compromised (e.g., the agreement between
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Reserve Bank of India and Government of J&K),
which furthered the state’s dependence on New
Delhi. In an ofcial report, the state government
admited that the confict has condensed
per capita Gross Domestic Product growth,
Foreign Domestic Investment infow, exports,
and trade fow in the state. The report also
mentioned that J&K lost 16000 crore during the
unrest of 2016. During the years 2016 and 2017,
168 curfews were imposed in nine districts of
J&K, resulting in huge fnancial loss to locals.
In 2019, the region witnessed the longest ever
communication blockade of 214 days, resulting
in huge losses to local businesses, and in some
cases even closures. The cost of the Kashmir
confict is difcult to ascertain due to limited
studies on the subject and non-availability of
data. In this paper, I document the economic
cost of the Kashmir confict and the efects of
Indian imperialism on the region’s society and
economy using a confict economics framework.
Keywords: confict; economy; Kashmir; politics; military

Introduction
The difficulty of having a traditional economic perspective
in contexts of conflict has been a challenge for researchers.
The fact that economics as a discipline focuses on gains and
exchange of trade, which takes place in a win-win scenario,
ignores the environment specified with imperfect enforced
property rights. This is the ground where conflict arises.
The valley of Kashmir is one of the biggest and bloodiest
conflicts in Asia and the most incomprehensible military
occupation in the world (Ali et al. 2011: 10). The region
has been a disputed territory since 1947 (Bhan 2016: 4).
The United Nations, in its resolution on 21 April 1948,
asked both India and Pakistan to resolve the question of
accession of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) through democratic
means of free and impartial plebiscite (United Nations
1948: 4). The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation––the
second largest intergovernmental organization with a
membership of fifty-seven states––in its 44th Session of
the Council of Foreign Ministers passed a unanimous
resolution reaffirming the right of the people of J&K to
self-determination and the final disposition of the conflict
to be made in accordance with the will of the people
(Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 2017: 21).
The independence movement of Kashmir has roots in the
1930s against the Dogra regime and India’s control after
1947. The massive rigging of the 1987 state legislative
assembly elections by the Indian authorities resulted in
the loss of the Muslim United Front—Kashmiri parties
supporting the right to self-determination who were
expected to form a majority government. Kashmiris tried
and failed in 1987 to achieve their just objective of the
right to self-determination through democratic means
that resulted in an armed struggle for the independence
of Kashmir. On 31 July 1989, two bomb blasts in Srinagar,
the summer capital of J&K, started the armed struggle in
Kashmir (Sikand 2001: 219).
In 2008, Kashmir witnessed a shift from armed struggle to
peaceful protest to achieve the rights of the people when
the All Parties Hurriyat Conference called for agitation to
protest on the transfer of land to Shri Amarnath Shrine
Board (SASB). The Amarnath land row erupted when 800
kanals (Urdu, Ud); a unit of land equal to 5445 square feed)
of land at Baltal in South Kashmir was deliberated to be
transferred to the SASB. However, Kashmiris were not
allowed to protest or have demonstrations peacefully;
instead, thousands were killed, injured, and arrested (Wani,
Suwirta, and Fayeye 2013: 56). This resulted in the revival
of recent armed struggle in the valley. “A youth leader
(India calls him militant) Burhan Wani… was killed in an

encounter with the Indian security forces on 8 July 2016”
(Butt 2016: 43). Also, scholars have highlighted how the
state manages Kashmir by keeping Kashmiris under permanent captivity that limits their choices (Duschinski 2009).
In recent years, the number of stone pelting incidents is
on the rise. The perpetual subjugation by the state forces
provoked civilians, whose political ways of manifestation
and demands over the decades have been denied, leading
them to engage in stone pelting. Stone pelting is not meant
to kill and has not caused any death (Chatterji 2010: 137).
The mass protests of 2010 and 2016 observed increased
participation of youth. In both demonstrations, juveniles
took part in stone pelting (Shah 2019: 8). India’s Ministry
of Home Affairs, in a statement on the militancy to the
Rajya Sabha on 07 February 2018, revealed that incidents
of stone pelting have nearly doubled from 730 in 2015 to
1999 in 2019.
The Ministry also reported on the annual details of what
the state terms ‘security force’ personnel and civilians who
lost their lives and ‘terrorists’ killed in violent incidents,
during the past three years in J&K (Minister of Home
Affairs 2018: 3). From 2015 to 2017, the number of violent
attacks increased to 342, while the number of civilian
deaths doubled to 40.
The conflict has resulted in not only human loss, but also
an economic loss of the oppressed class. To ascertain the
financial cost of the conflict, it is imperative to go through
the previous scholarship in this area. Haavelmo’s (1954)
study one of the pioneering works in the field of conflict
economics. The study modeled the fundamental choice
between appropriation and production in a general-equilibrium setting. However, over the past few decades, there
has been progress in placing appropriation and conflict
discourse in economic discipline into a larger perspective.
Weapons are still considered to be a vital part of any
conflict, and an economic perspective considers weapon
as inputs. Unlike the case of traditional economics where
inputs are used to produce useful outputs, conflict situations use weapons to inflict adversaries on the other party,
which results in a win and loss of the parties involved.
Hirshleifer (1989: 110) termed such a function as “technologies of conflict” and provided mathematical models for
analysis and computation of the probability of win and loss
of the parties.
In the case of the Kashmir conflict, the “technologies of
conflict” model would predict the win of India and losses
for Kashmir, given the quantity and variety of the weapons
India is in possession of. However, in empirical studies
wherein the relationship between military expenditure
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and economic growth using panel data of 36 developing
countries were examined, there were significant and
adverse effects of defense expenditure on economic
growth in India (Hou 2009: 4).
The basic rent-seeking model by Nitzan (1994) highlights
the rationality of the relationship between the parties
while contesting for a given resource. In this case, the two
contesting parties are India and Pakistan, while Kashmir
is the resource. However, in a revolutionary situation, the
optimal behavior of parties lacks, which is not the case
for the traditional neoclassical economic framework. The
nonexistence of a higher authority to which each party is
answerable makes enforcement of contract and the terms
of the economic relations challenging. Also, there are an
ample number of agreements that define the economic
relationship between Kashmir and India which cannot be
analyzed in the traditional economic framework, given the
anarchic state and financial standing of Kashmir.
The quantum of the finances that India is spending to hold
Kashmir has time and again been questioned by intellectuals like Arundhati Roy. The amount of public finances
needed to maintain the military occupation of Kashmir
could be spent on improving public services and infrastructures like hospitals, schools, and food for malnourished
populations in India. “India needs azadi [Ud; independence]
from Kashmir just as much if not more than Kashmir needs
azadi from India” (Ali et al. 2011: 43).
In addition to having financial implications, the occupation has fractured the human relationships between Delhi
and Kashmir. A study examined how the mass participation in protests and mass presentation of collective grief
in the Kashmir valley shows a long history of desire for the
sovereignty of the J&K (Malik I 2018). India’s occupation
of Kashmir has also broken the historical trade routes.
J&K used to act as an essential trade-transit, linking the
undivided India with the whole of central Asia through the
silk route (Pandow 2017: 4).
The government of India has not allowed true democracy to be established in J&K state. Elections, which have
provided a façade of democracy, have functioned to install
individuals representing the interests of the Indian state
whose focus was to please their masters in New Delhi
and not the economic development of the state (Butt and
Pandow 2012). Scholars have also addressed the ways in
which India has offered Kashmiris the choice between
political demands and economic development to shadow
the state violence and militarization. This exposes India’s
status as an emerging postcolonial power that seeks
to doggedly possess Kashmir (Kaul 2018: 13). There are
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instances where rights have been refigured, as in the case
of Hill Councils in Kargil (Bhan 2009: 71-93). Scholars have
also explained how locals fear for the loss of territorial
sovereignty that would pave way for settler-colonialism,
and rampant exploitation of economic resources that
would result in neocolonial mal-development (Zia 2020: 60).
Although a recent survey conducted by Conciliation
Resources notes that the desire across the divided Kashmir
region can be different, some uniting factors on which
both sides agree are economic development, participation,
and local control (Conciliation Resources 2016: 18). It has
also been argued that Sadhbhanava, the military operation
meant to promote “people-oriented programs” involving a
significant sum of funds, has been used as a tool to manage
the anger of local people against the loss of land, death,
and injury. The military, through this program, has made
inroads into local communities and made them financially
dependent on the Indian state (Zia 2014: 307). These operations further legitimized the army’s role in governance
and civil-society in post-colonial democratic-states like
India (Aggarwal and Bhan 2009: 519).
The basic premise of the literature on conflict economics
is that concerned parties, most of the time, face a trade-off
between producing goods and seizing goods from others.
This paper focuses on this tradeoff between appropriation and production by studying the interaction between
parties under anarchy. There have been many models
given by economists at various times and have contributed to the literature on conflict economics (Anderton
and Carter 2009; Brauer and William 2017; Esteban and
Ray 1999; Garfinkel 1990; Grossman 1991; Grossman and
Kim 1996; Skaperdas 1992; Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2006;
Hartley 2006; Hartley and Sandler 2012; Mehlum, Moene,
and Torvik 2003; Wittman 2000). Although these works
provide a detailed review of the literature at a global level,
there have been negligible contributions from emerging
economies like India and Pakistan.
In this paper, I apply conflict economics to the situation
in Kashmir by examining various economic sectors that
the government of India, through various apparatuses,
has employed to take control of varied resources during
normal times (or lull periods) followed by vicious cycles of
violence. The analysis considers efforts to control water
resources, land, financial institutions, and many other
resources.
Abrogation of Article 370
On August 5, 2019, the Narendra Modi government
initiated the abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian

constitution and the division of the J&K state into two
separate Union Territories: Ladakh and Jammu & Kashmir.
Legal experts viewed it as an attack on the constitution
(Peerzada 2019). Some have even termed it a ‘dictatorship’ on the part of the government of India (Pandey and
Tripathi 2020: 9). Not allowing any sort of dissent, the
government of India arrested thousands of locals and even
placed three former chief minsters (pro-Indian politician)
of J&K under arrest. Their arrest happened immediately
following their condemnation of the decision which they
termed as India’s betrayal towards Kashmiris (BBC 2019).
Immediately after the revocation of the Article, the
government of India opened up the gates for businessmen
from mainland Indian to invest in J&K, and many of them
were enthralled by the move (Behl 2019). To date, the
government failed to convince and attract foreign investments to Kashmir. In a recent visit to Kashmir, foreign
envoys from various countries have mentioned that
Kashmir is beautiful, but not conducive for investments
(Ganai 2020). Meanwhile, scholar have always opposed the
state’s opening of economic sectors like tourism to the
outside investor, as it could cause environmental degradation (Navlakha 2007: 4034-4038).
This unilateral decision is seen as a loss of territorial
sovereignty, and researchers believe that the move will
pave the way for settler-colonialism to lead to rampant
exploitation of resources, which would result in neocolonial
mal-development (Zia 2020: 1). Researchers have called for
solidarity with Kashmir in the context of growing capitalism
that indicates a colonial formation (Goldie 2019: 2). Within
few months of revocation of the Article 370, businessmen
from outside the region started encroaching on the local
resources that otherwise were exclusively meant for the
locals. In the region, there are around 554 mineral blocks,
each measuring a maximum of ten hectares, that were auditioned (Javaid 2020: 1). In 2020, the majority of mining rights
in Kashmir were secured by outside firms, as many local
contactors could not file their applications for e-auctions
due to the government’s order on restrictive communication in Kashmir (Parvaiz 2020:1). Similarly, on 12 August
2019, Mukesh Ambani, the owner of Reliance Industries and
India’s richest man, announced his company would setup a
taskforce meant for investment in J&K (Thakurta 2019).
The Economist Intelligence Unit, in its report on the
stripping of Article 370, forecasts, “The costs of the move
are more likely to be felt within India. We remain doubtful
that the change in status will deliver either economic
dividends or the closer relationship between J&K and India
that the BJP is aiming for. More certain, however, is that

the move will do considerable damage to security and
political stability within the Kashmir Valley” (2019).
Hydro-economics and confict
Jammu & Kashmir’s rights over one of the most precious
natural resources, water capital, were taken away by New
Delhi through the infamous Indus Water Treaty of 1960,
which was mediated by the World Bank. The International
Water Management Institute has stated that the Indus
Water Treaty deprived J&K state of approximately 6500
crore1 annually, and that the treaty has negatively affected
the power-generation and agriculture-potential of the
state (Iqbal 2018: 8). Also, scholars have argued how citizen
activism has furthered and strengthened the state’s ability
use and manage Kashmir’s water resources (Bhan and
Trisal 2016).
The treaty governs the usage of the waters of the Indus
river basin. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 (IWT) was
signed on 19 September 1960, by India’s Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s President Mohammad
Ayub Khan, and mediated by World Bank Vice President
W. A. B. Iliff. The Indus river systems’ annual flow is double
that of the Nile and three times that of the Tigris and
Euphrates combined. The IWT allocated the waters of the
three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej to India. While
the waters of the three western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and
Chenab were for Pakistan, the treaty provided provisions
that India could use some of the waters for purposes of
hydro-power, irrigation, and other uses (World Bank 1960).
The waters of the Indus basin have a direct bearing on
the economic development of J&K. Kashmir, which is the
primary issue of contention between India and Pakistan,
has been affected by the IWT. The western rivers of the
Indus basin, which the treaty establishes are meant for the
exclusive use of Pakistan, flow through J&K, resulting in
the restricted use of these waters for the purpose of power
generation and irrigation (Sahni 2006). In 2002, J&K’s legislative assembly unanimously passed a resolution calling
for a dissolution of the IWT, which restricts the usage of
the waters from western-rivers and unlawfully restrains
the development of the state (Zawahri and Michel 2018).
Researchers have also studied how dams in Kashmir have
deprived locals of their own resources while curbing their
freedom and capability to move freely in a space now
under military control (Bhan 2018). Dams displace about
362 families and takes 533 acres of land for fueling India’s
growing economy (Bhan 2014: 191). New Delhi’s apparatus
through which the state controls resources like water
includes India’s hydropower generation company, National
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Installed
Capacity
(MW)

Design
Energy
(MU)

Year of
commissioning

Capital
Cost as of
31.03.18

Tariff
(18-19)
(INR /Kwh)

S.
No

NHPC Project &
State

1

Salal, (6x115)

690

3082

1987 (Nov)

1012.93

2.36

2

Uri-I, (4x120)

480

2587.38

1997 (Apr)

3440.88

2.1

3

Dulhasti, (3x130)

390

1906.8

2007 (Mar)

5219

6

4

Sewa-II, (3x40)

120

533.53

2010 (Jun)

1156.3

4.52*

5

Chutak , (4x11)

44

212.93

2013 (Jan)

939.9

8.45

6

Nimoo Bazgo,
(3x15)

45

239.33

2013 (Jan)

1062.05

9.79

7

Uri –II, (4x60)

240

1123.77

2014 (Feb)

2433.77

5.61

8

Kishanganga
(3x110)

330

1712.96

2018 (Mar)

5755.24

3.54*

2339

11398.7

Total

Projects
Pakal Dul (4x250) J&K

Source: Author compilation
(National Hydro Power
Corporation 2018)
Note: *provisional estimate

21020.0.7

Installed Capacity
(MW)

Design Energy
(MUs)

Cost (In Cr.) & PL

1000

3330.18

8112 (Mar 13)

Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC). The J&K government
considers the NHPC to be exploitative, draining the state’s
power potential as the “East-India-Company of New
Delhi” (Ali 2011; Dar 2012). New Delhi owes 20000 crore
to J&K State for using their water as a reparation for the
power-generated from their resources (Bashir 2015).
As illustrated in Table 1, the total installed2 capacity of the
NHPC operational project throughout India as of June, 2018
stands at 5451 megawatts (MW), while the total installed
capacity from J&K is 42.9%. Also, the company is operating
eight projects in J&K with a cumulative capacity of 2339
MW, which is over one third of the total hydro-power
generated by the company in other states (Ali 2018). This
means that Kashmir’s water is a gold mine which the
government of India is exploiting to the fullest.
In addition, the NHPC has another project under construction in J&K: Pakal Dul, a hydroelectric project under
construction in the village of Drangdhuran in J&K with
an installed capacity of 1000MW. The project is currently
under development by Chenab Valley Power Projects
as a joint venture between NHPC (49% stake), Jammu &
Kashmir State Power Development Corporation (49%
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Table 1: National Hydro
Power Corporation
operational projects in
Jammu & Kashmir

Table 2: Joint venture NHPC project
under construction
Source: Author compilation (National
Hydro Power Corporation 2018)

stake), and Power Trading Corporation India (2% stake)
(see Table 2).
According to the NHPC (2018), the power-house package
has been awarded, and the work on the dam has started.
The bidding process for the other works is under progress. The NHPC has other joint venture projects currently
awaiting clearance, such as Kiru, with an installed capacity
of 624 MW, and Kwar, with an installed capacity of 540 MW.
According to the NHPC (ibid), forest clearance has been
approved by the state forest department of state government, and environment clearance granted by Ministry of
Environment, Forest and Climate Change Government of
India (MoEF). Regarding Kwar, the environment clearance
has been granted by MoEF, and the state forest department has granted the forest clearance. And one of the
NHPC projects, Bursar, is in the pipeline having an 800MW
capacity for which Detailed Project Reports have been
submitted to the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) and
are currently under examination by the CEA and Central
Water Commission (ibid).
With the stripping of the Article 370, New Delhi, through
NHPC, is speeding up the hydropower projects as the

government directly control the region. The projects
includes 800MW Bursar3 and 850MW Ratle4, the latter
coming up at an investment of around 6,215.61 crore
(Bhaskar 2019).
As stated above, these NHPC projects are exploitative in
nature, resulting in economic losses to J&K. The geographic
locations of the projects are also troublesome because
the region is categorized in vulnerable seismic zones IV
and V, which are prone to earthquakes. This makes these
dams susceptible to earthquakes, thereby risking the lives
of locals. The NHPC and the central government are least
bothered about the risks, but rather interested in expansion and controlling water resources of J&K.
Despite such a grim situation, there is a silver lining of cooperation, giving peace a chance for the greater good of South
Asia. Some studies (e.g., Hassana, Afridi, and Khan 2017)
suggest the need for environmental diplomacy to initiate
negotiation, trust-building, and regional cooperation to
have peace and sustainable development. Another study
(Hussain 2016) suggests the need for hydro-diplomacy by
bringing the stakeholders of South Asian countries together
for cooperation on the Indus basin river system. This would
mean just and equitable distribution of natural resources.
Land grab and occupation
India’s control over J&K is not restricted to water
resources, as the government of India through its army
and other forces have occupied vast swaths of land as well.
Although it is difficult and challenging to ascertain the
actual quantity of the property in possession by the Indian
army and other allied forces in J&K, it is possible to gauge
the phenomenon of the substantial land grab in J&K.
The Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS) indicates that the current deployment of regular Indian army
and other forces in J&K is estimated to be over 700,000
personnel (Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society 2015:
35), turning the region into the largest militarized deployment in the world, with one armed personnel for seventeen
civilians. Also, there are studies that suggest presence of
Indian troops, with a ratio of one soldier for every eight
Kashmiris (Zia 2019: 1037). Moreover, there has been an
emergence of a new form of military, multilateral, and
humanitarian occupations that reinforces institutionalized
vehemence against occupied people (Duschinski and Bhan
2017).
The stationing of this colossal army has resulted in the
land grab of diverse topographies, including forests, hills,
glaciers, mountains, stream beds, paddy fields, and peripheries of lakes, in both urban and rural settings, thereby

establishing permanent military structures. The exact
figure of land under Indian armed forces in J&K is highly
disputed, as huge chunks of the area remain illegally
occupied, which was never officially demarcated, requisitioned, leased, mutated, or attained under the J&K Land
Acquisition Act (Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society
2015: 37).
During Omar Abdullah’s tenure (2009-2015) as Chief Minister
of J&K, the J&K government admitted in the state assembly
that in the three regions of Ladakh, Kashmir, and Jammu,
the army has occupied 1,054,721 kanals of land. At that time,
the Indian military illegally occupied 855,407 kanals of land
and had legal rights over 199,314 kanals that had been transferred by the state government to the army (Milli Gazette
2013; Nabi and Ye 2015). More recently, Chief Minister
Mehbooba Mufti (2015-2018) claimed that more than 4.3
lakh5 kanals of land in J&K is under the illegal occupation
of Indian army and other military forces stationed in the
state. The Chief Minister, on record, informed the legislative
assembly that 51,116 kanals of state land in Jammu province
and 379,817 kanals of land in Kashmir and Ladakh are under
unauthorized occupation of the Indian army (Wani 2018).
The JKCCS (2015: 38) documents that the occupation is
not limited to land only, but also includes 1,856 buildings,
including 1,526 private buildings, 280 government buildings, 14 industrial units, give cinemas, and 28 hotels. The
irony is that most of the owners of these establishments
have not been paid rent and that whenever the military
has paid rent, it is negligible compared to the real worth of
the property under the occupation. The Public Commission
on Human Rights in 2005 identified 46 schools and educational establishments occupied by armed forces (Public
Commission on Human Rights 2005: 39).
Indian authorities have furthered the occupation by
acquiring land through agencies such as the National
Highway Authority of India, Indian Railways, and others
in the name of improved connectivity and development.
There have also been forcible land acquisitions for projects
including highway and railways (Bhat 2018). In addition,
the Defense Ministry of India billed the J&K government
500 crore last year for its assistance in carrying out rescue
and relief operations during the devastating floods in the
valley in September 2014 (Press Trust of India 2018).
In a report by the Oakland Institute Research Team, in
context of scrapping of the Article 370, the researchers call
the investment could be a “Trojan horse for forcing the
demographic composition of Kashmir” and adds that this
move resembles to that of the “illegal Israeli settlements in
Palestine’s West Bank” (Mittal 2019).
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The government of India is using occupation as a tool
to disempower residents of Kashmir. As stated above,
military rule has systematically furthered the land grab,
making inhabitation hard for the locals and rendering the
population dispossessed. It does not end here, as Delhi uses
other apparatuses like controlling financial institutions to
strengthen their hold on Kashmir.
Control over fnancial institutions
The Indian state, over decades, has gradually and systematically used numerous measures to ensure economic
imperialism of the J&K, which has included control over
of the local financial institution, the Jammu and Kashmir
Bank Limited (JKB). The JKB was incorporated on 01
October 1938 and started its operation on 04 July 1939. The
JKB was the first state-owned bank established as a government company under the Companies Act 1956 operating as
“bankers to the state government” (Hussain 2014).
In April 2011, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) entered into
a supplementary agreement under section 21A of the RBI
Act of 1934 with the government of J&K to carry out their
banking business. Through this agreement, RBI became
the lone agent for the investment of the state government
funds, which JKB had previously performed for the state
as banker to the state government, while the JKB became
an agent of the RBI for the conduct of general banking
business of the J&K state government. The agreement
between the state government of J&K and the Reserve
Bank of India has two critical aspects: one financial and
one political.
Regarding the financial aspect, in the past, JKB acted as a
critical contributor to the financial stability of J&K through
overdrafts. The state government used to borrow as much
as 1500 crore from the JKB to meet its various obligations
by the Ways & Means Account, a necessary practice due to
delayed financial assistance from New Delhi. It enabled the
government of J&K to manage the temporary mismatches
between expenditures and receipts. In the years following
the agreement, the state’s treasuries bills over 450 crore
were pending for payment in Kashmir (Akmali 2014). Also,
the bank used to have highest Credit Deposit ratio at fortythree percent, while the national banks used to have same
at twenty-three percent, thereby indicating that banks
used to invest money outside the state owing to discouraging government policies for private investments in the
state (Navlakha 2005: 349-351).
Regarding the political aspect, the agreement pushed the
J&K government further towards total dependence on New
Delhi, resulting in economic subjugation. Hussain (2010)
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argues that the state government would have to often
visit New Delhi with a “begging-bowl for petty-finances.”
Also, the then opposition party, Peoples Democratic Party,
termed the move as the most lethal nail in the coffin
of J&K’s autonomy by the then ruling party, National
Conference.
More recently, the state administrative council headed by
J&K governor S.P. Malik has turned JKB into a Public Sector
Bank, which has meant taking away its independence and
making it answerable to the J&K state legislature (Jaleel
and Iqba 2018). This act also and brought JKB under the
realm of the J&K Right to Information Act6 and the Central
Vigilance Commission7.
Time and again, political interventions by the government
of India have not only affected the premier financial institution of the state, JKB, but have also had adverse impact
on the overall economy of Kashmir. This is worsened
by the frequent curfews and shutdowns which further
distress J&K’s economy.
The bank has lost all its autonomy that it used to derive
under the Article 370. Also, the bank has undergone much
restructuring, and all the shareholding that the state used
to own are now owned by New Delhi since the revocation
of the Article (Sidhartha 2019).
Economics of shutdowns
The recurrent curfews and protests are ruining the state’s
economy, a fact that cannot be denied. However, the
‘normalcy’ in the state acts as a device for New Delhi to
push J&K further into economic captivity. The state has
long been using the economic losses due to the frequent
protest and unrest in Kashmir as a ploy to placate the azadi
sentiment among the locals.
An examination of the modalities of the economics of
shutdowns leads to findings that contradict the state’s
narrative on substantial economic losses. Hussain (2016)
provides insights on the frequency of major unrests that
took place in Kashmir since June 2008, including the
Amarnath land row in 2008, Shopian rape and murder case
in 2009, the summer turmoil in 2010, and the uprising in
2016. Regarding the uprising in the year 2016, the government of J&K projected the losses due to the unrest at over
16000 crore for a period of five months from July 8 to
November 30 (PTI 2017). In 2010, the government claimed
losses of 21,000 crore for 85 days (Jehangir 2010).
During 2013, the state claimed losses of 4,500 crore over
26 days of curfew following the hanging of Afzal Guru
(Bhattacharya 2016). Contrary to the government’s claims,

Year

Losses (INR Crore)

No. of Shutdowns

2012

23

3

2013

1088

5

2014

N/A

5

2015

423

5

2016

655

10

2017

1776

32

2018

N/A

65

2019

N/A

55

a careful analysis of these figures reveals the flawed and
fabricated nature of the state’s narrative on the economic
losses–a ploy used by inflating these figures to divert the
public attention from the real losses and the loot suffered
by J&K through its various apparatuses.
Hussain (2010) provides a detailed analysis showing that
the gross state domestic product (GSDP) of around 38000
crore suggests that the state produces goods and services
worth 104 crore daily. The main impact of the unrest is
in Kashmir valley, and it comprises almost 50 percent
of the GSDP, or 50 crore daily. The tertiary sectors of
the economy are the main hit in the conflict situation
like Kashmir. The primary and secondary sectors of the
economy, which are the backbone of J&K’s economy, had a
negligible impact due to the unrest. According to Hussain
(ibid), the ongoing political turmoil has resulted in losses
of twenty to 25 daily crore; for 80 days, the loss would
go 1600 crore and not 21000 crore, defying the state’s
narrative.
Since J&K is a consumer economy, political unrest in the
valley causes considerable losses to the states that export
various products to J&K. The poultry farmers in north
India, mostly in Punjab, were severely affected. Some estimates suggest that these poultry traders export over half
a million eggs and around fifty thousand chickens a day
to meet the vast demand of J&K. These imports cost about
fifty million rupees a day. As 90 percent of the poultry
farmers from Punjab are dependent on the exports to
Kashmir, any political unrest in the valley cost these states
heavily compared to the Kashmir (ibid).
As demonstrated in Table 3, frequent internet shutdowns
also impact daily activities (BRIEF 2017: 11). Due to the
frequent internet blackout by the government, J&K

Table 3: Financial losses due to internet shutdowns in Kashmir
(Malik S 2018b; Sofware Freedom Law Centre, India 2020)

suffered losses amounting to 4000 crore between 2012 and
2017 (Malik S 2018a).
The undeclared internet shutdowns also hamper business growth, particularly in information technology and
related fields in the valley. JKCCS documents 42 instances
of unreasonable curtailments and total suspensions of
telecommunication and internet rights from 08 July 2016,
to 31 December 2017, based on reliable news reports and
first-hand knowledge (Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil
Society 2017: 32).
The state government, on 03 April 2019, issued an order
(353-Home (ISA)) that barred civilian traffic on the
highway of Srinagar-Jammu on Sundays and Wednesdays
each week to allow smooth movement of the army convoy.
The economic experts expect huge loss owing to this
blockade order.
According to a report issued by the Kashmir Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, the abrogation of Article 370 has
affected business immensely and dented the local economy
to the tune of 17878 crore (Kashmir Chamber of Commerce
and Industry 2019: 6). This decision forced 340,000 tourists to leave within 24 hours and resulted in a loss to the
tourism sector, which contributes eight percent to the
state’s GDP. Local players also suffered immensely (Sharma
2019). It also caused closure or hefty loss of business to the
twelve information telecommunication companies who
employ around 1500 people in the Kashmir valley (Wani
2019).
Cross Line-of-Control trade
In 2008, the governments of India and Pakistan opened the
Line of Control (LoC) for limited trade as a measure aimed
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at building confidence between the different sides in J&K.
On 21 October 2008, the first truck drivers and traders met
on the Chakothi-Uri Bridge in Kashmir. After six decades
of violent conflict and the absence of any connection
between the two sides, this marked a fundamental step for
trust building and peacebuilding in the region. Due to its
broad appeal, cross-LoC trade has sustained, even during
periods of heightened political tension and unrest in the
region. Ten years later, cross-LoC trade remains a barter
trade limited to specific goods. The registration process
is lengthy, and the numerous checks for the truck drivers
make it a cumbersome process.
Cross-border trade offers livelihood and business opportunities while also increasing cultural exchanges and
connections of divided families. The villages where
cross-LoC trade takes place have seen reduced violence,
renewed economic activity, and lives transformed (Pentori
2018). When trade along the Poonch-Rawalakot crossing
was stopped in July 2017, local lobbying efforts were
able to push and advocate for its reopening four months
later. Without the intangible benefits behind it and the
symbolism it holds for local communities, it most likely
would not have prevailed.
Trade volumes across the LoC have shown an upsurge from
2008 to 2015, with the trade of goods worth 699 million US
dollars. The cross-LoC trade has also fetched perceptible
financial paybacks to the traders and other associated
stakeholders (Hussain and Sinha 2016). The cross-LoC trade
has crossed 5000 crore mark in 2018 since its inception on
21 October 2008, and is emerging as the significant confidence-building-measure (Ehsan 2018). India’s order on 18
April 2019 to suspend the cross-LoC trade (particularly
after the scrapping of the Article 370) left 1700 traders in
distress. The local business community sees no hope that
the trade would be restored (Khajuria 2020).
Conclusion
Although It is difficult to ascertain the cost of conflict
in Kashmir due to the limited literature and non-availability of data, it can be concluded that the ‘normalcy’ is
furthering the clutch of India’s economic imperialism in
Kashmir. The government of India, through many of its
apparatuses in J&K, facilitated the state to take control
over numerous resources during the normal times—lull
periods before another violent period.
The occupation includes control on water resources, land
grabs, and control of the state’s financial institution. The
precious cost that Kashmiris suffer is in terms of human
loss (i.e., figures of an exact number of casualties due to
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the conflict) are not precise and are contested by both
sides. Take the case of the Indus Water Treaty: the state
suffers on an average of 6500 crore annually. On account
of frequent internet shutdowns, Kashmir suffered losses
amounting to 4000 crore between 2012 and 2017. Of late,
the scrapping of Article 370 provides New Delhi direct
control over the stated economic resources thereby
making it easy for the state to tighten its grip over the
region and control the descent.
The state imposes frequent curfews that not only affect the
normal life of locals but also severely impact the economy
of the state. The state, in the form of confidence-building
measures, started LoC trade to showcase it globally.
However, on the ground, the state has put in numerous
curbs on the free flow of goods, and in this era of technology, traders are forced to go for barter trade.
Though there are many studies which have contributed to
the existing literature in the field of conflict economics,
Kashmir has not been a focal point for researchers. The
data presented in this study allow us to better understand
the state’s narrative and its implications on the ground,
as well as how the occupying state uses various apparatuses to control economic resources and disempower
inhabitants.
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Endnotes
1. One crore is equal to ten million.
2. Maximum output of electricity that a project can
produce.
3. Developed on Marusudar River, near village Pakal in
Kishtwar District.
4. Hydroelectric project on the run-of-the-river, Chenab
River.
5. One lakh is equal to one hundred thousand.
6. Legislation intended to provide citizens of the state
with a legal mechanism for obtaining government records.
7. The apex institution set to monitor all vigilance activity
under the Central Government.
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